Previously, I received my BA in Political Science and International Relations in 2017 at Bogazici University and MA in International Relations in 2019 at Koc University, Turkey. I received my MA in Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh in 2021 with specializations in International Relations and Political Methodology. I expect to receive my PhD in Political Science from the University of Pittsburgh in 2025.

Please contact me at mek200@pitt.edu.

Under Review

[1] A Rebel with a Sanction: UN Sanctions against Non-state Armed Groups and Civil Conflict Duration (with Omer Zarpli)

Existing research has mostly focused on state-targeted economic sanctions in civil wars. However, rebel groups have been sanctioned more than states in civil conflicts after the Cold War. Yet, no other study has systematically examined whether these sanctions reach the intended goal of hastening conflict resolution. We argue that mainly due to uncertainties over enforcement, sanctions would exacerbate information asymmetries, leading to prolonged conflict. The sides would hold out and continue fighting to acquire more information about how the relative power would be affected. But in cases where there is less uncertainty, the sanctions would not lead to longer conflicts. We find empirical support from the analyses of all civil conflicts between 1990-2017. Further analyses provide support for the causal mechanisms. Parties tend to refrain from entering into negotiations after the rebels are sanctioned. The findings have important implications for the scholarly literature on economic sanctions and civil conflict, as well as policy communities.

[2] International Rival, Military Intervention, and Duration of Civil War (with Jungmin Han)

Does military intervention extend the duration of civil war? To answer this question, extant studies have focused on the impact of one-sided vs. two-sided interventions on conflict duration, but their results are mixed. We attribute the inconsistent outcomes to the lack of scholarly attention to the relationship between external interveners. Specifically, we argue that two-sided intervention prolongs civil wars when the intervening two states are rivals. The competitive relationship motivates the intervenors to maintain or reinforce their sponsorship of protégé, which would make the civil war longer by exacerbating the commitment problem between the warring parties domestically. We test our argument with multiple survival models on civil wars between 1975 and 2017, and the findings are consistent with our theoretical expectations. The civil wars with two-sided military interventions lasted longer when two intervening parties were in a rival relationship. Also, we were able to check the mechanism by finding that the rival intervenors stay longer in civil wars than the others. Overall, this study contributes to our understanding of the impact of the intervention on civil war by looking at the relationship between intervenors instead of their number.